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1 Introduction 
South Africa's constitutional dispensation is based on the premise that all 
existing laws are subject to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1996 (the Constitution), including African customary law, and that all laws are 
limited only by the Constitution.1 South African customary law is a body of law 
by which millions of South Africans regulate their lives in a multicultural 
society.2
 
 It existed long before the adoption of the Constitution which, among 
other things, aims at harmonising the different cultural practices that exist in the 
country. It is apparent that some traditional cultural practices that still exist are 
in conflict with the Constitution but, until they are challenged before a court of 
law, they will remain enforceable in our communities.  
In other words, even though the Constitution is in force, there are many 
unresolved theoretical and practical problems arising from the application of 
customary law within the constitutional framework.3 For example, many 
customary systems of succession are guided by the principle of male 
primogeniture: a deceased's heir is his eldest son, failing which, the eldest 
son's oldest male descendant is his heir.4
                                            
* LLB (U) Vista, LLM (UP), Lecturer: Department of Private Law, School of Law, UNISA. 
 In most cultural traditions women are 
ineligible to be traditional leaders of their tribes. When the traditional leader has 
only daughters, the throne automatically passes to his brother or oldest living 
male heir. It is apparent that, if male children are linked through their father to 
1  Rautenbach 2003 Stell LR 109 and 113. 
2  Schoeman-Malan 2007 PER 1. 
3  Himonga and Bosch 2000 SALJ 317-318. 
4  SALC 1998 www.saflii.org/. Bennett Customary law 335. Rautenbach and Du Plessis 2004 
SAJHR 1. 
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the royal lineage, their inheritance of the traditional chieftaincy is guaranteed 
irrespective of their seniority or age. This custom, which entails that traditional 
chieftaincy is retained only in the male line, is in most instances enforced by 
traditional authorities. The traditional authorities can be seen as communal 
structures that are capable of either perpetuating the primogeniture principle or 
developing community customs to bring them in line with the aspirations of the 
Constitution. It may be asked to what extent traditional authorities are capable 
of doing the latter. This case note aims at analysing the traditional authority's 
role in the development of customary practices in line with the Constitution, 
particularly with regard to the advancement of the right of women to inherit 
traditional chieftaincy thrones. To date, the emphasis is still mainly on the 
advancement of women's and children's rights in general, a process that seems 
to be advancing too slowly, despite being rooted in constitutionally protected 
rights. 
 
The decision of the Shilubana v Nwamitwa5 is subsequently discussed. The 
case concerns an application to the Constitutional Court for a leave to appeal 
against a decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal6 substantially confirming a 
decision of the Pretoria High Court7
 
 that prevented a woman from being a Hosi 
of her own community. 
 
2 Facts 
The facts of the case were as follows: The principle of primogeniture governed 
the succession to the traditional chieftaincy of the Valoyi community for five 
generations.8
                                            
5  Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC) (hereafter the Shilubana case). 
 On the death of the Hosi (traditional leader), Fofoza Nwamitwa, in 
1968, the traditional chieftaincy lineage of the Valoyi community was disrupted. 
Since Hosi Fofoza's eldest child was a daughter and he did not have a male 
heir, his brother Richard Nwamitwa succeeded him as Hosi of the Valoyi. Hosi 
6  Shilubana v Nwamitwa (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) SA 
432 (SCA) (hereafter Shilubana v Nwamitwa). 
7  Nwamitwa v Phillia 2005 (3) SA 536 (T) (hereafter the Nwamitwa case). 
8  Nwamitwa case 540F (n 11). 
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Richard succeeded to the throne despite the fact that Hosi Fofoza's eldest 
daughter (Ms Shilubana) was old enough to be given the throne.9 In 1996 the 
Valoyi Royal Council unanimously resolved to restore the chieftainship to Hosi 
Fofoza's eldest daughter. The resolution noted:10
 
 
[T]hough in the past it was not permissible by the Valoyis that a female child be 
heir, in terms of democracy and the new Republic of South Africa Constitution it is 
now permissible that a female child be heir since she is also equal to a male child. 
The matter of chieftainship and regency would be conducted according to the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
 
However, Ms Shilubana did not want to replace Hosi Richard at that stage, and 
he continued to rule. In 1997 Hosi Richard endorsed a resolution appointing Ms 
Shilubana as Hosi but later, in 2001, he withdrew his support. After the death of 
Hosi Richard in 2001, the chieftainship of the Valoyi community, the royal 
family, tribal council, local government representatives, civic structures and 
stakeholders of various organisations again proclaimed Ms Shilubana as the 
Hosi.11 Hosi Richard's eldest son, Sidwell Nwamitwa, obtained a court interdict 
against the inauguration ceremony of Hosi Shilubana on the grounds that he 
was entitled to succeed to the traditional chieftaincy of the Valoyi as an heir to 
the late Hosi Richard. He obtained a further court order that the third to sixth 
applicants (third applicant: District Control Officer, fourth applicant: the Premier, 
Limpopo Province, fifth applicant: MEC for Local Government and Housing, 
Limpopo, sixth applicant: National House of Traditional Leaders) should 
withdraw the letters of appointment issued to Ms Shilubana and should instead 
issue letters of appointment to him.12
 
  
The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal decisions respectively found 
that prior to the interim Constitution,13
                                            
9  Nwamitwa case 540F par 3 (n 11). 
 in terms of the Valoyi cultural practices 
from 24 October 1968 and at least prior to 1994, women could not be appointed 
10  Nwamitwa case 540F par 4 (n 11). 
11  Nwamitwa case 540F par 5-6 (n 11). 
12  Nwamitwa case 540F par 6-7(n 11). 
13  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution). 
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as a Hosi.14 Therefore, the SCA agreed with the high court on the following 
grounds:15
 
 
(a) That its finding was not gender-based since the facts of the case "do not 
bring [it] to the gender equality claim which the [applicants seek] to 
vindicate". 
(b) That the official appointment of Ms Shilubana was not in accordance 
with the customs and traditions of the Valoyi, and that these customs 
were not constitutionally problematic. 
 
Therefore, Ms Shilubana took the matter to the Constitutional Court on the 
grounds that she had been prevented from being a Hosi by virtue of her 
gender. The Constitutional Court set aside the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal with the under-mentioned judgment.  
 
 
3 The decision of the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court had to clarify the issues described below for the 
consistent development and application of customary law by a consideration of 
the following: (1) whether or not a traditional authority has a duty to develop its 
customs and traditions in contemplation of promoting gender equality in the 
succession of chieftainship, in accordance with the Constitution, even if this 
discrimination occurred prior to the coming into operation of the Constitution; 
and (2) the way courts of law are to apply customary law as required by the 
Constitution, while acknowledging and preserving the institution and role of 
chieftainship and the functioning of a traditional authority that observes 
customary law. 
 
The Constitutional Court noted section 211 of the Constitution, that is, that the 
institution, status and role of chieftainship are recognised subject to the 
                                            
14  Shilubana v Nwamitwa case par 46 (n 10). 
15  Shilubana v Nwamitwa case par 50-51 (n 10). 
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Constitution. Therefore observance of customary law by traditional authorities 
must be in accordance with the applicable legislation and customs, including 
amendments to or repeal of that legislation and those customs. Thus it is the 
duty of the court to apply customary law where it is applicable, subject to the 
Constitution and relevant legislation.16 The norms of customary law are 
informed by factors such as the traditions of the community concerned as 
guided by a consideration of the past practices of the community.17
 
 The court 
found that the development of customary law would imply some departure from 
past practices which seem to constitute a threat. A threat to the recognition of 
the development of customary law occurs when a rule requires an absolute 
consistency with past practice before a court will recognise the existence of a 
customary norm. This would result in the courts' applying laws which 
communities themselves no longer follow, and would stifle the recognition of 
new rules adopted by the communities in response to the changing face of 
South African society. This route would be in conflict with the aspirations of the 
Constitution and thus unacceptable to society at large.  
Therefore the development of customary law must be guided by the 
contemporary practice of the community in question.18 The court acknowledged 
that past practices should not be interpreted as being irrelevant in today's 
society, since such practices and traditions may still be of considerable 
importance in customary law, but should be considered together with other 
important factors. The court further made it clear that the time when customary 
law had to be proved as foreign law in South Africa is a thing of the past.19
                                            
16  Shilubana case par 42 (n 9). 
 In 
consequence, where a norm emanates from a tradition, with no indication that a 
contemporary development has occurred or is occurring, past practice will be 
sufficient to establish a rule. However, in instances where the contemporary 
practice of the community suggests that change has occurred, past practice 
17  Shilubana case par 44 (n 9). 
18  Shilubana case par 55 (n 9), Van Breda v Jacobs 1921 AD 330 (hereafter Van Breda 
case). 
19  Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 (4) SA 218 (C), 2003 (7) BCLR 743 (C) par 30 (hereafter Mabuza 
case). 
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alone is not enough and does not establish a right with certainty.20 Past 
practice will also not be decisive where the Constitution requires the 
development of the customary law in line with constitutional values.21
 
  
It is, furthermore, the very same community that observes customary law that 
must develop it, and this communal decision must be respected in accordance 
with section 211 of the Constitution. Therefore, the free development by 
communities of their own laws to meet the needs of a rapidly changing society 
should be encouraged, respected and facilitated.22 The Constitution had done 
away with the hierarchy of laws in which parliamentary statutes and common 
law were preferred over customary law. 'Living' customary law was not always 
easy to establish and it might sometimes not be possible to determine a new 
position with clarity. The court encouraged the parties to assist it in resolving 
their disputes by placing credible evidence of the present practice in their 
communities before it. The duty of the court, in those instances, would be to 
examine the law in the context of a community and to acknowledge 
developments if they had occurred.23 The court found that the need for flexibility 
and the imperative to facilitate development must be balanced against the 
value of legal certainty, respect for vested rights and the protection of 
constitutional rights. In the Bhe case, the Constitutional Court found that the 
protection of women and children would be achieved by not allowing the 
development of the customary law of succession in a piecemeal and 
sometimes slow fashion.24 In adjudicating a customary law matter the court 
must remain mindful of its obligations under section 39(2) of the Constitution to 
balance the development of customary law by the communities with the 
jurisdiction of the courts.25
                                            
20  Mabuza case par 44-49 (as above). 
 In addition, the Constitutional Court held in 
21  Shilubana case par 56 (n 9). 
22  Shilubana case par 45 (n 9). 
23  Shilubana case par 46 (n 9); Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha (Commission for Gender 
Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2004 ZACC 17; 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); 2005 (1) 
BCLR 1 (CC) (hereafter the Bhe case) par 86,107 and par 152-154. 
24  Bhe case par 110-113 (n 28). 
25  Shilubana case par 48 (n 9). 
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Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security26 that section 39(2) imposes an 
obligation on courts to consider whether or not there is a need to develop the 
common law to bring it into line with the Constitution and, if so, to develop it, as 
was the case with customary law.27
 
 The court would, however, respect and 
enforce any development that happened within the community to the extent that 
such development was in line with the protection of rights.  
In addition, the imperative of section 39(2) must be acted on when necessary 
and deference should be paid to the development by a customary community of 
its own laws and customs where this is possible and consistent with the 
continuing effective operation of the law.28 In determining Sidwell Nwamitwa's 
claim to the traditional chieftaincy, the Constitutional Court held that the past 
practice of the Valoyi was important but not decisive in determining whether or 
not Mr Nwamitwa had the right he claimed.29 The Valoyi authorities intended to 
bring an important aspect of their customs and traditions into line with the 
values and rights of the Constitution. Several provisions of the Constitution 
require the application of the common law and customary law, as well as the 
practice of culture or religion, to comply with the Constitution.30 If traditional 
authorities purported to apply customary law subject to the Constitution,31
                                            
26  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 ZACC 22; 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC); 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) par 34-36 
(hereafter Carmichele case).  
 it 
must next be asked whether or not they had the authority to act as they did. 
The Constitutional Court found that there was no evidence to permit it to rule on 
traditional authorities, as they had a broad discretion in appointing a traditional 
leader and were not bound simply to appoint the heir by birth. Therefore it had 
no basis on which to overturn the High Court's finding that, in terms of the 
existing customary law, the role of the royal family is more than formal only 
where there is no candidate for the chieftainship, or where the candidate is not 
suitable, which was not alleged to be the case in the matter under 
consideration. 
27  Bhe case par 44, 48 and 215 (n 28). 
28  Shilubana case par 49 (n 9). 
29  Shilubana case par 57 (n 9). 
30  Refer in this regard to sections 1(c), 2, 30 and 31 of the Constitution.  
31  Shilubana case par 68 (n 9). 
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However, even if the High Court were correct on that point, it had to be true that 
the traditional authorities had the power to act as they did for the reasons that 
follow.32 It was noted that the traditional authority was the highest decision-
making structure within the traditional community on matters of succession. If 
the authorities had only the narrow discretion the High Court found them to 
have, it followed that no other body in the community had more power in that 
regard. This would therefore mean that nobody in the customary community 
would have the power to make constitutionally driven changes in chieftainship. 
This result could be seen if one considered what would have happened, in the 
narrow view, if the traditional authorities in the present case had sought simply 
to install a woman as Hosi. Even if she were the eldest child of the previous 
traditional leader, it would follow on the narrow view that the traditional 
authorities would have no power to appoint her unless there was no other heir 
or the male heir was unfit to rule. It would be necessary, according to this view, 
to approach the courts before a woman could be installed as a Hosi.33 The 
court emphasised the need to empower communities to bring their customs in 
line with the norms and values of the Constitution. Any other result would be 
contrary to section 211(2) and would be disrespectful of the close bonds 
between a customary community, its leaders and its laws.34 If the traditional 
authority had only those powers accorded it by the narrow view, it would be 
contrary to the Constitution and frustrate the achievement of the values in the 
Bill of Rights. The court's power in section 39(2) of the Constitution should be 
exercised judiciously and sensitively, in an incremental fashion,35 and in a 
manner that would empower the community itself to continue the 
development.36
 
  
As the Supreme Court of Canada37
                                            
32  Shilubana case par 71 (n 9). 
 had held in relation to the common law, 
33  Shilubana case par 72 (n 9). 
34  Shilubana case par 73 (n 9). 
35  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 ZACC 10; 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC); 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) par 
167/174 and 189 (hereafter Du Plessis case). 
36  Shilubana case par 74 (n 9). 
37 R v Salituro 1992 8 CRR (2d) 173 at 189. 
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[t]he judiciary should confine itself to those incremental changes which are 
necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of 
our society.  
 
The court found that this statement, in the South African context, should not be 
seen to detract from the obligation of courts to uphold the new values with 
which our legal system has been infused.38 Therefore, the court found that the 
appointment of Ms Shilubana as a Hosi represented a development of 
customary law which was an essential step in respecting community-led 
change parallel with the value of legal certainty and the need to protect rights.39 
The legal effects of the change – the installation of a particular leader – were 
clear. Mr Nwamitwa was not a Hosi but had an expectation to be appointed 
Hosi owing to the 1968 decision and on the basis of past practice. The court 
found that his expectation could not override the decision of the traditional 
authorities to adapt their customs in accordance with the values and rights of 
our democracy as embodied in the Constitution.40 The actions of a traditional 
authority could not be illegitimate just because they involved a departure from 
past practice.41
 
 The Valoyi authorities had chosen to restore the line of Hosi 
Fofoza going back one generation, although it was true that Ms Shilubana's 
installation left some questions unanswered relating to how the Valoyi 
succession would operate in the future. However, customary law was living law 
and would in future inevitably be interpreted, applied and, when necessary, 
amended or developed by the community itself or by the courts. This would be 
done in the light of existing customs and traditions, previous circumstances and 
practical needs and, of course, the demands of the Constitution as the supreme 
law.  
Although the Valoyi people had moved away from any previously existing rule 
that a woman could never be appointed as a Hosi, other aspects of the 
customs and traditions governing chieftainship had not necessarily been 
affected. For example, the principle that a Hosi is born and not elected indeed 
                                            
38  R v Salituro par 36 (n 42). 
39  Shilubana case par 75 (n 9). 
40  Shilubana case par 78 (n 9). 
41  Shilubana case par 79 (n 9). 
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exists; it was not necessarily changed by this ruling as Ms Shilubana was born 
as the child of a Hosi. Her birth was crucial to the decision of the royal family.42 
Furthermore, such additional developments of the law as Ms Shilubana's 
installation might necessitate were in the first instance a matter for the relevant 
traditional authorities, acting in accordance with custom, practical needs and 
the Constitution. It was, however, not these future decisions that were before 
the Constitutional Court, and nothing further had to be said about them.43 The 
value of recognising the development of its own law by a traditional authority 
was not in this instance outweighed by factors relating to legal certainty or the 
protection of rights. The royal family intended to act to affirm the constitutional 
values in chieftainship in its community. A balancing of the effects of its action 
revealed no consideration that should prevent the Constitutional Court from 
recognising its actions as such.44
 
 The Constitutional Court found that the 
conclusions of both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal that the 
traditional authorities lacked the power to act as they did were incorrect. The 
court found that the Supreme Court of Appeal erred in its judgment, as its 
decision was too narrow and tied to the statement that a Hosi is never 
appointed but born, and unable to countenance that the lineage would change 
from that of Hosi Richard to that of Hosi Fofoza. Accordingly, Mr Nwamitwa had 
no vested right to the chieftainship of the Valoyi, but only an expectation to be a 
Hosi. However, past practice of the Valoyi community was not determinative 
and did not itself guarantee that Mr Nwamitwa's possible expectation had to be 
fulfilled. The contemporary practice of the Valoyi reflected a valid legal change, 
resulting in the succession of Ms Shilubana to the chieftainship. 
 
                                            
42  Shilubana case par 81 (n 9). 
43  Shilubana case par 82 (n 9). 
44  Shilubana case par 84 (n 9). 
B MMUSINYANE  PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
146/161 
4 Evaluation 
4.1  Appointment of women to traditional chieftaincy thrones 
Both the legislature and the judiciary are mandated to provide remedies in 
order to correct injustices and promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society, such as equality, human dignity and freedom.45
 
 Despite 
numerous objections to women as leaders in their respective communities, 
recent trends indicate that the 1996 Constitution is progressively harmonising 
customary practices with constitutional values in enabling women to occupy 
traditional chieftaincy thrones. The following examples indicate the changing 
trends in viewing women as equally capable leaders in their respective 
communities.  
The first example is the succession of the daughter of the late traditional leader 
Serobatse of the Bafokeng Ba Ga Motlala in Lichtenburg, North-West Province, 
which was occasioned by the traditional leader not having a male heir. Although 
she ascended the throne as the daughter of the traditional leader, her 
descendants are not entitled to the throne because the link with the royal family 
in her case is through the mother and not the father, as is required by custom.46 
In Botswana the progressive development of customary law reached a notable 
milepost when a woman was appointed by the tribal authority as the first 
traditional leader in her community after both her brother and her father had 
died.47
 
 However, the development of customary law in this regard seems to 
have been clouded with much controversy prior to the acceptance that women 
should enjoy the same right as men to rule their communities.  
This controversy can be best illustrated by the objections which have been 
raised since 1999 with regard to the traditional chieftaincy claim by Refilwe 
Mabalane (Refilwe) of the Baphiring community in the North-West Province on 
the grounds that she is a woman, despite her being the eldest daughter of her 
                                            
45  Van Rensburg 2001 Obiter 217. 
46  Ntshabele "Reflections". 
47  BBC News 2008 news.bbc.co.uk. 
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late father. Of six children born into the royal family Refilwe is the eldest child, 
and her brother is the fifth-born. Refilwe's case is yet to be resolved. On the 
face of it, Refilwe faces direct discrimination against her as a woman, since the 
chieftaincy throne has traditionally been exclusively reserved for men.48 
Nevertheless, the fact that more communities seem to accept women as their 
leaders reflects the progress of true gender transformation in chieftainship. The 
Shilubana judgment must be seen as a classic example of the application of 
customary law by the traditional authority that is in line with the Constitution as 
well as with principles of public policy and natural justice.49
 
 The Shilubana 
judgement reflects the plight of women under customary law. 
4.2   Exposition of the position of women under customary law 
It needs to be acknowledged that women have been assigned a subservient 
role by customary practices since time immemorial. Their stigmatisation by their 
communities has played a critical role in discrimination against their gender for 
many years, and it has exposed women to various obstacles of a historical and 
cultural nature to their active and equitable participation in the political and 
social realms (particularly in denying them access to traditional chieftaincies). 
This was largely a function of men's traditional roles as breadwinners and 
defenders of the family against danger.50 The traditional chieftaincy, according 
to the rules of patrilineal succession, was always inherited by the eldest son of 
the founding father of the land.51
 
  
Clearly, if they objected to this custom women could have been ostracised for 
disobeying the dictates of the culture of their community, and thus deemed to 
be inviting misfortune. Bennett states that women were treated as minors in 
traditional African society;52
                                            
48  Molefe 'Judgment' City Press 11. 
 while still unmarried, a woman remained under the 
guardianship of her father or uncle, and after her marriage she was under the 
49  Van Rensburg (n 45) 219. 
50  Mokotjo 2006 www.ufs.ac.za. 
51  Bennett (n 4) 120. See also Olivier et al Indigenous law 4-5.  
52  Bennett (n 4) 251-252. 
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guardianship of her husband.53 One exception to this is the custom of the 
Modjadji community, which dictates that only women may rise to the leadership 
of their community. From 1854 until 2005 all of the leaders of the Modjadji 
community have been women.54 On the basis of the Shilubana decision, the 
Modjadji customs can be challenged on the basis of gender discrimination, and 
there would be no merit in attempts to deny the claims of any rightful male heir 
on the grounds of his gender. Despite improvements in the protection of 
women's rights, gender discrimination is still prevalent in South African society. 
Little has changed in the lives of ordinary women, many of whom are subject to 
customary law, tradition and other patriarchal social and cultural practices.55 
Bennett states that, because African culture is steeped in the principle of 
patriarchy, the gender equality clause threatens a thorough purge of customary 
law.56 One example is the achievement of gender equality in traditional 
authorities, which is still seen as a challenge. In terms of customary law, with 
the exception of the Modjadji traditional chieftaincy, women may not hold 
political office.57
 
  
Traditional authorities have lobbied in vain to have customary law exempted 
from the Bill of Rights,58 one of their reasons being that they saw the 
Constitution as a threat to their customary and traditionally accepted views on 
the position of women in society. However, the drafters of the Constitution 
declared gender equality as one of the non-negotiable clauses to be included 
therein.59 The adoption of the Constitution was a milestone in ending 
discrimination and ensuring equality for all, particularly previously disadvan-
taged groups – women constituting one of the most severely disadvantaged 
groups. It was found in Egan v Canada60
                                            
53  Ntshabele (n 46).  
 that discrimination can come about as 
much as an effect of distinctions that are in themselves not intentionally 
discriminatory as from an overtly discriminatory purpose, and those individuals 
54  Molefe 'Ruling' City Press 11. 
55  Gender Links [no date] www.genderlinks.org.za/.  
56  Bennett 1994 SAJHR 122. 
57  Molefe 'Ruling clouds' City Press 11. 
58  Ntshabele (n 46). 
59  Ntshabele (n 46). 
60  Egan v Canada (AG) 1995 (2) SCR 513 par 38. 
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and groups that are more generally vulnerable in society are also likely to 
experience the discriminatory effects of such distinctions more severely. The 
final Constitution can be regarded as a catalyst that aims to ensure the removal 
of all traces of patriarchy in our society.61 It promotes non-discrimination and 
requires everyone to be treated with equal dignity irrespective of the obedience 
to traditional cultural values that a certain community may have observed until 
now.62 It should be noted that customary law was designed principally to 
regulate family relationships. Although most women in contemporary society, 
through force of circumstances, engage in extra-familial activities, there is no 
directly relevant rule of customary law to govern this novel situation aside from 
generally outdated notions that women are subordinate to men.63
 
  
Albertyn and Goldblatt state that equality, as a value and as a right, is central to 
the task of transformation.64 As a value, equality gives substance to the vision 
of the Constitution. As a right, it provides the mechanism for achieving 
substantive equality, thus legally entitling groups and persons to claim the 
promise of this fundamental value and providing them with the means to 
achieve it. The Constitution regards everyone as being equal in the eyes of the 
law, and has entrenched the practical implementation of this equality. This 
means that no one is perceived as having more rights than others, and that 
men and women enjoy equal rights regardless of their culture, status and 
gender. It is the same customary practices that allow women to act as regents 
in situations where an heir may not be in a position to ascend the throne. Such 
a practice can be seen in Lichtenburg, in the North-West Province, where the 
widow of the late traditional leader Seatlholo was appointed to rule the 
community in an acting capacity on her son's behalf from the time of her 
husband's death.65
                                            
61  Ntshabele (n 46). 
 Therefore, the permanent appointment of a woman would 
not come as a surprise to the communities concerned. The debate around the 
continued existence of many (if not virtually all) customary practices in the 
62  S 9 of the 1996 Constitution. 
63  Bennett (n 4) 127. Heureux-Dube 1997 SAJHR 338. 
64  Albertyn and Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 248. 
65  Ntshabele (n 46). 
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constitutional dispensation usually manifests as a conflict between the right to 
gender equality and the right to culture.66 As a signatory of the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), South 
Africa has an obligation under international law to eradicate all forms of 
discrimination against women.67
 
 In terms of article 2(f), states are called upon 
to  
take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against 
women.68
 
 
Therefore the advancement of women's rights in South Africa can be seen as a 
progressively developing process under the guidance of both the Constitution 
and international law. 
 
The patrilineal way of doing things has been remodelled to accommodate 
women as leaders of their communities. This accommodation has initiated 
discussion regarding the role of women in other cultural practices that have 
been exclusively reserved for males. Such cultural practices include but are not 
limited to the performance of certain customary rituals that were mainly 
performed by men, allowing women to now enter previously secluded places 
such as a cattle kraal to participate in certain rituals. But it remains up to the 
respective traditional authorities to prescribe from time to time how such 
cultural practices that conflict with their constitutional rights could be remodelled 
to include women who are leaders in their communities.  
 
4.3   The role of traditional authorities in developing customary law  
4.3.1  Transformation of the traditional leadership 
The transformation of traditional leadership (as defined below) was 
spearheaded by the enactment of the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act.69
                                            
66  Pieterse 2000 De Jure 39. 
 This Act aims to transform traditional leadership in line with 
67  CEDAW 2006 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm. 
68  CEDAW (n 67). 
69  Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003. 
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the Constitution, at the same time undertaking to restore the integrity and 
legitimacy of the traditional authority as an institution in accordance with 
customary laws and practices.70 One of its goals is the progressive realisation 
of gender equality within traditional authorities in a manner that promotes 
freedom, human dignity, and the achievement of equality and non-sexism. To 
ensure compliance with these undertakings, the Act determines that at least a 
third of the members of a traditional council must be women.71
 
  
Section 3(2) (d) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 
determines that where it has been proved that an insufficient number of women 
are available to participate in a traditional council, the Premier concerned may, 
in accordance with a procedure provided for in the provincial legislation, 
determine a lower threshold for the particular traditional council than that 
required by paragraph (b) of the same section.72 However, there is a huge 
disparity between reality and the ideal of what the Act states to be a minimum 
threshold. As a rule, the members of traditional councils are still predominantly 
men, who are reluctant to relinquish their customs to accommodate women. 
The Act envisages that the appointment of traditional leaders should be done 
with due regard to the observance of the customary laws of the community 
concerned.73 The Act accommodates the role of traditional leaders on all levels 
of executive government, but it is a role that is more symbolic than 
substantive.74
 
 The ruling on the role of traditional authorities in the Shilubana 
judgment may have come at a time when it was not expected by most African 
communities that reserve traditional leadership exclusively for men.  
4.3.2  Defining traditional authority/leadership 
Traditional authority/leadership is defined as an aggregate institution which 
includes the position of the traditional leader or king, the deputy, the royal 
family, the secret advisory body, the headmen of small villages, and the 
                                            
70  Bennett (n 4) 114. 
71  S 3 (2) (b) of the Act (n 75).  
72  S 3(2) (d) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (n 69).  
73  Ntshabele (n 46). 
74  Ntshabele (n 46). 
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traditional council.75 Previously traditional authorities were generally viewed as 
still holding conservative views about the customs and traditions of their 
communities.76 Traditional authorities are perceived to be at the forefront of 
hindering the development of customary laws in accordance with the applicable 
constitutional principles. At the same time they are seen as playing a critical 
role in the day-to-day operation of their communities by ensuring observance of 
and compliance with the customs of the community by the subjects, as well as 
disciplining contraventions by members of the community.77
 
  
It is clear that the exercise of their power must operate within the parameters of 
the Constitution. Moreover, these authorities must be seen to play an important 
part in the development of customary law in line with the Constitution. They 
should monitor whether or not socio-economic and political developments are 
taking place in their communities. They enjoy a high status and significant 
support among their people since they are regarded as the custodians of 
African culture and customary law, and hence they also perform a variety of 
important executive and judicial functions.78
 
 Accordingly, they play a critical role 
in educating and empowering their community to understand the impact of the 
Constitution and its relations with their customary laws. As a result they should 
also be able to develop their customary laws in line with the Constitution 
without first being forced to do so by the courts. 
4.3.3  Who should develop customary law? 
The Constitutional Court has noted the power of traditional authorities to make 
constitutionally driven changes to customs and traditions, as failure to do so 
would frustrate the objectives of the Constitution. Customary law is adaptive by 
nature and the courts should recognise any changes in customary law, 
especially where such changes bring the customary law in line with the values 
and spirit of the Constitution.79
                                            
75  Ntshabele (n 46). 
 Therefore the traditional authorities, not the 
76  Ntshabele (n 46).  
77  Tshehla 2005 www.iss.co.za. 
78  Pieterse (n 66) 49. 
79  De Vos 2008 constitutionallyspeaking.co.za. 
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courts, must be responsible for developing customary law in line with the 
Constitution.80
 
 What differentiates this approach from the court-driven one is 
that customs and traditions that have been developed directly by traditional 
authorities can be seen to have a sense of belonging to the communities. 
Courts are seen as socially distanced from the communities they serve, so their 
knowledge of customary law is bound to be second-hand.81 Unlike ordered 
dispositions by the courts, traditional authorities regard themselves as being at 
the forefront of developing their own customs and traditions. In instances of 
disputes, the duty of the court will be limited to exercising its powers conferred 
by section 39(2)82 to determine if the purported development by the traditional 
authority did promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.83 
Section 211(2) of the Constitution84 regards traditional authorities as primary 
agents of development. They are seen as the representatives of the community 
and as such are entrusted with an important responsibility, namely that of 
harmonising community customs and traditions with the ethos of the 
Constitution.85 However, traditional authorities should not see themselves as 
unilateral decision makers. They are still required to consult with their 
communities about matters that will particularly affect the community's customs 
and traditions. This is based on the premise that it is the communities at large 
that will have to conform to the developed traditions and customs. Hence, such 
traditions and customs cannot be changed without the community's knowledge 
or consultation. It is important to respect the right of communities that observe a 
system of customary law to develop their law, particularly if the initiative comes 
from them.86
                                            
80  Shilubana case par 68, 72, and 73 (n 1), s 39(2) and 211(2) of the Constitution. 
 Only if the community at large fails to develop its customs will 
evidence have to be placed before the courts of the present practice of that 
81  SALC 'Harmonisation'. 
82  Shilubana case par 74 (n 9). 
83  S 39 (2) of the 1996 Constitution. 
84  The 1996 Constitution. 
85  The 1996 Constitution. 
86  Shilubana case par 45 (n 9). 
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community. The court will then have to examine the law in the context of the 
community and acknowledge developments if they have occurred.87
 
  
4.3.4  Procedure for developing customary law  
The community's adherence to customary rules is centred on having 
consultative meetings to deliberate on matters affecting the community. It is 
from these meetings that decisions are made and have to be complied with. 
Therefore, a traditional authority may adopt a system of majority rule in 
changing its customs and traditions, but at the same time must not ignore the 
concerns of the minorities. Even if the majority of the community has voted in 
favour of changing the customs, the courts will remain the independent arbiter 
of the Constitution. The courts have a duty to protect the rights of the minorities 
and others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic 
process.88 Therefore, the custom development process should be guided not 
by what the majority are saying, but by whether or not the decision taken by 
traditional authorities is in the interests of what is fair and just in terms of the 
Constitution and the community at large. The Constitutional Court has 
reiterated the importance of traditional authorities in taking the initiative to bring 
their customs and traditions in line with the Constitution. Therefore traditional 
authorities are empowered to change and update their customary law in 
compliance with the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act89 
and the Constitution.90 Thus, in cases where many customs and traditions in 
South Africa remain un-codified (non-statutory),91
 
 any development in them 
would be acknowledged if it could be made in writing. 
 
                                            
87  Bhe case par 86 (n 28). Shilubana case par 49 (n 9). 
88  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 377 (CC) par 88-89. 
89  S 2(3) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (n 69). 
90  S 211(2) of the 1996 Constitution. 
91  Rautenbach (n 1) 107. 
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5 Conclusion 
Without doubt one is likely to see more women appointed to traditional 
chieftaincy thrones as a result of the Shilubana judgment. This approach is 
indeed an achievement for the protection and fulfilment of women rights. The 
Shilubana judgment builds on the Bhe judgment, in which the court imposed 
changes to the customary law rules on inheritance, thus bringing them in line 
with the requirements of gender equality in the Constitution.92 The Shilubana 
judgment93 is sensitive to the needs of the community itself and emphasises 
the importance of respecting decisions made by traditional authorities 
especially when they are in line with the spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights.94
 
 
The restoration, especially by traditional authorities, of the chieftaincy thrones 
to people (women) who were historically barred by custom and tradition indeed 
brings legal certainty – women are also eligible to occupy positions such as 
those of traditional leadership. The Constitution should be used as a vehicle for 
reforming traditional authorities and the latter should be encouraged to take the 
initiative in developing their own customary law before it becomes necessary 
for the courts to intervene.  
The development of customary law in response to the Shilubana judgment is an 
essential step in reversing the unfair discrimination that prevented women from 
succeeding to traditional chieftaincy thrones.95 Traditional authorities should not 
be allowed to reverse the progressive realisation of gender equality by 
retreating to archaic values.96
                                            
92  Bhe case par 45 (n 28). 
 The Shilubana case makes it clear that, 
irrespective of gender, the first-born child should succeed his or her father. It 
should be acknowledged that a second problem may now arise, because only 
those of royal blood are accepted as rightful heirs to the throne, and women 
born within the royal bloodline in fact would not bear children from the royal 
bloodline. Thus, controversy may arise that the authority of the community is 
being alienated to strangers, or that strangers are being introduced into the 
93  Shilubana case (n 9). 
94  De Vos P (n 79). 
95  Himonga and Bosch (n 3) 314. 
96  Ntshabele (n 46). 
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royal blood. The appointment of heirs to the throne must therefore be exercised 
with due regard to the observance of the customs of the community 
concerned.97
 
  
It is important that separate cases be dealt with on their own merits. There is a 
need for a strong and sustained initiative to educate rural communities so as to 
make a qualitative improvement in gender relations in the rural areas and to 
pave the way for more substantive equality in the full range of socio-economic 
issues.98 An essential step in the entrenchment of constitutional democracy in 
those segments of our society that practice customary law is to encourage 
traditional authorities to transform themselves voluntarily, taking into account 
the provisions of the Constitution. Equal citizenship entails being able to take 
part in the shaping of the society in which an individual or people live. To 
women it means challenging the spoken and unspoken prejudices that keep 
them out of public life.99
 
 The Shilubana decision has ensured that the 
appointment of women to traditional chieftaincy thrones will be in accordance 
with the boni mores test, when seen in the context of the societal conditions 
and the dynamic nature of particular societal groupings. The decision gives 
recognition to women as adult human beings who are capable of leading and 
building their communities as leaders. Traditional authorities that take the 
initiative in appointing women as traditional leaders should therefore be praised 
for developing customary law in fulfilment of their duties as enunciated in 
section 211 of the Constitution.  
                                            
97  Ntshabele (n 46). 
98  Ntshabele (n 46). 
99  Ntshabele (n 46). 
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